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THE PROPORTIONAL DAMAGE RULE IN
COLLISIONS AT SEA
ALFRED HUGER*

In the bleak waters of the North Sea, some thirty years or more
ago, a collision occurred which gave rise to lawsuits in London,
Antwerp and Rotterdam. One of the shipowners brought suit in the
Court of Admiralty in London; owners of cargo sued in the Commercial Court of Antwerp; and the Dutch relatives of a seaman
who had lost his life in the disaster brought suit in Rotterdam. All
three Courts found both the colliding vessels in fault for the collision,
holding one of the ships grossly negligent and the other guilty of a
technical violation of the navigation rules. Although the three
decisions were the same on the question of fault, the practical results
of the several litigations were entirely different. In Antwerp the
cargo owners recovered four-fifths of their damages; in London
the shipowner one-half; in Rotterdam the family of the deceased
seaman recovered nothing. At that time the English rule was the
same as the American rule,-that in case of mutual fault damages
are divided equally between the offending vessels without regard to
the degree of fault. In Belgium, where damages were apportioned
according to the gravity of fault, the defendant vessel was made
to respond to the extent of four-fifths of the plaintiff's damages.
In Holland, where the Roman law prevailed, where both vessels
are to blame, neither party is permitted to recover.'
It was to end this chaotic condition in the laws affecting international ocean commerce that there was eventually organized, in
i8g6, what is known as The International Maritime Committee, a
highly representative body of merchants, shipowners, underwriters
and lawyers. The objective of this Committee is to discuss reforms,
pronounce upon their value, and, in so far as reasonably practicable,
bring about uniformity of law. A great deal of preliminary work has
been done by this Committee, and as a result of its deliberations there
came before what is known as the International Diplomatic Conference (Conf6rence Internationalde DroitMaritime) which convened in
Brussels in 19og and 1gio, several proposed International Con-

ventions. Two of these, one on Salvage and one on Collisions at Sea,
*Of the Bar of Charleston, South Carolina.

'See Franck, A New Law for the Seas (1926) 42 L. Q. RFv. 25. This article
gives an excellent history of the Comit6 Maritime International.
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were signed by representatives of the principal maritime nations
of the world, including the United States, in September, igio, and in
due course were submitted to their respective governments for ratification.2 The Salvage Convention was ratified by the'United States,
January 18, 1912 and on August 1, 1912, a bill to give effect to this
3
Convention became a law.
The Convention on Collisions has been ratified by nearly all the
great maritime nations, except the United States, but has never been
submitted to our Senate. 4 This Convention adopted the principle of
proportional liability in cases of collisions at sea due to mutual faults
of the colliding ships.
If the Brussels Collision Convention should be ratified by the
United States Senate and made effective by appropriate legislation,
the result would be to change radically the rights and obligations
of the parties involved in a collision between two or more vessels
guilty of fault. The present American rule, derived from Great
Britain and known as judicium rusticum, requires an equal division
of damages no matter what the degree of fault. Thus, if ship A
sustains damages in $ioo,ooo and ship B in $50,000, ship A will
recover $25,000 from ship B, being one-half of the difference. If
cargo is involved in the disaster, it is regarded as "innocent" and its
owner is permitted to recover in full from either vessel, which in turn
is entitled to obtain contribtition from the other vessel held in fault.
If ship A were sunk by the collision and with her cargo became a
total loss, the owner of the cargo of ship A could recover in full from
ship B, which in turn would be permitted to set off one-half of the
amount paid to the cargo against the balance in favor of ship A.
Under the Brussels Convention, in case the Court should hold
ship B three-fourths and ship A one-fourth in fault, ship A's recovery.
from ship B would be in 15roportion to the gravity of fault found
2
The delegates duly accredited by the United States were the Hon. Walter C.
Noyes, United States Circuit Judge, of Connecticut; Charles C. Burlingham,
Esq., a distinguished lawyer, leader of the Admiralty Bar of New York City;
Edwin W. Smith, a distinguished lawyer of Pittsburgh, Pa., and Hon. A. J.
Montague, Ex-Governor of the State of Virginia and now a member of Congress.
3
"An Act to Harmonize the National Law of Salvage with the Provisions of the
International Convention," etc., being Act of August I, 1912, 37 Statutes at
Large, C. 268.
4
The following countries have ratified the Convention on Maritime Collisions:
Argentine, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain,
Greece, Holland, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal,
Roumania, Russia, Sweden.
The following countries have not yet ratified: The United States of America,
Chile, Cuba, Italy, Spain.
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against ship B; or $75,000 (3/4
of $ioo,ooo). Ship B's recovery from
ship A would be in proportion to the gravity of fault found against A;
or $12,500 (Y4 of $5o,ooo). Thus, ship A's net recovery would be
$62,5o0.
If cargo were involved, its owner would recover in like
proportions from the respective ships, unless they were protected by
statutory exemptions-(The Harter Act-The Limited Liability
Act). The Htarter Act,5 section 3, relieves a shipowner from liability
for faults or errors in navigation or in management of a vessel provided he has used due diligence to make her seaworthy and in all
respects properly manned, equipped and supplied for the voyage.
The Limited Liability Act 6 prescribes certain circumstances under
which the shipowner may limit his liability to the value of his ship
and the amount of her pending freight at the place of and immediately after the accident;7 when, if his ship be sunk and a total loss and
there is no pending freight, nothing can be recovered by anyone
from her owner. Until the ratification of the Collisions at Sea Convention by Great Britain and the subsequent Maritime Conventions
Act, xgi, the law of Great Britain and of the United States was
6The Harter Act of February 13, 1893, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §§ 8029-8035

See The Delaware, x6I U. S. 459, 16 Sup. Ct. 516 (1896) which sets forth the
situation which induced the Harter Act. There the court, as a part of the history
of the times, quotes from the petition addressed by .the Glasgow Corn Trade
Association to the Marquis of Salisbury. This petition sets forth the complaint of
merchants against sea-carriers because of the increasing number of shipowners'
exemptions from all sorts of liability provided in bills of lading.
In 1924 the English Parliament passed the "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act."
It substantially embodies "The Hague Rules 1921" as modified in 1922 and 1923.
"The Hague Rules 1921" may be read in 1923 A. M. C. 63. They have not yet
been adopted in the United States but are now before Congress. Terms of the act
imposing responsibilities and liabilities of carriers are compulsorily added to
bills of lading and are absolute and unalterable. The rights and immunities
given the carrier, however, may be surrendered by special terms embodied in the
contract. The act restricts freedom of contract, but fixes the carrier's minium
responsibilities. It makes more certain the rights of the holder of a negotiated
bill of lading. The act represents a compromise between shipowners and shippers
respecting the various provisions in bills of lading limiting liability and is said to
reflect the spirit of our Harter Act.
See COLE, CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT (2d ed. 1925), Hague Rules Explained,which book gives a good review of the history of the act and the disputes
involved between various interests.
6
The Limited Liability Act, Act of March 3, 1851, U. S. Comp. Stat. §§ 8021,
et seg., supplemented by Act of June 26, 1884, U. S. Comp. Stat. § 8028, c. 121,
and amended by Act June i9, I886, c. 421.
7
Place v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co., i18 U. S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. iio (1886);
Thomasen v. Whitwill, i18 U. S. 520, 6 Sup. Ct. 1172 (1882); Boston Marine
Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Redwood Lumber Co. 197 Fed. 703 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1912).
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the same as regards ships, but very different as regards the rights of a
cargo-owner. In Great Britain the rule, before 1I11, was that the
owner of cargo could recover only one-half his damages from each of
the vessels, because the liability of each ship to the cargo-owner was
held to be several, and not as in the United States where such liability
is held to be joint and several.
This article will sketch the origin and development of what is
known as the Admiralty Collision damage rule, show wherein the
English and American rules differ and with what results; also wherein
the Maritime Convention Rule differs from the old rules of the Admiralty and what changes adoption of the Convention rule would
bring about in the admiralty law as administered in the United
States. This will be followed by a discussion of some of the reasons
advanced for and against a ratification of the Convention.
ORIGIN OF THE

RULE

DIVIDING Loss

8

The first instance of the rule dividing loss appears in the early
codes founded upon the Laws of Oleron. In 1505 there was printed
the Code of Wisby, which was an important commercial centre in
Gottland in the i 3 th and 14th centuries. This Code provided that if a
ship under way collides with one at anchor she must make good
the whole of the damage to the anchored ship, unless her master and
crew swear the collision was accidental, in which case she is only to
pay one-half. In some of the other codes the rule is not confined to
one ship being at anchor. In the Hamburg, Hanseatic and Danish
Codes, Consolato del Mare, Ordonnance of Louis XIV., various circumstances are provided for and the proportions recoverable fixed.
In Malacca in the i3th century, in certain cases of collision, when
ships were sailing in company for protection against pirates, the colliding ship pays one-third of the damage. In other Eastern codes the
injured ship recovers two-thirds of the damage. Bynkershoek, in
1629, attempted to persuade the Judges of the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands to adopt a proportionate rule in accidental collisions,
but those Judges strongly dissented. 9
The Rule in England
In the English Admiralty the rule had an interesting development.
Prior to 1614, in collision cases, the English Courts gave either full
8
See MARSDEN, COLLISIONS AT SEA (8th ed.) i34-167, especially note pp. 153
et seq., for a full account. The writer acknowledges indebtedness to its authors.
9
.T d. 155.
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damages 'or none at all. In that year for the first time a sentence,
affirmed on appeal, condemned the defendant, who was alone to
blame, to pay one-half the loss to cargo of the other ship and the
whole of that ship's damage. From 1623 to 1645, where the defendant's ship was found to blame, sometimes half and sometimes whole damages were granted the plaintiff. In 1647, for the
first time half damages were given because the cause of the collision
was uncertain. In the I7th century the losses were divided or apportioned in many cases, but the various reasons given cannot be reconciled. Some of them were: that the collision was not wilful; that there
was difficulty in proving negligence; that it was too difficult to
apportion the loss to the gravity of fault. As late as 1789 damages
and costs were equally divided in a collision case due to inevitable
accident.I0 Finally, in 1S6, in a decision by Lord Stowell, there
appeared an obiter dictum which declared that the rule of division of
loss could only be applied in cases of collision caused by the fault of
both ships." The rule was apparently not in accord with the prior
High Court of Admiralty decisions12 but was approved by the House
of Lords.3 and has ever since been the rule. This rule was stigmatized
by Cleirac 4 as judicium rusticum as also by Chancellor Kent, 5
1
16
and has been criticized by Lord Denman, Lord Selborne, L. C., 7
Lord Blackburn, 8 and others. 9 In applying this rule in a case of a
cargo loss in 186i, Dr. Lushington held that, although the cargo
owner was innocent, he could recover only one-half of his loss, because the court "can affix to the vessel proceeded against only half
' 0 Nom. c. Fawcett in the Ass. Boo.
See 2 BROWN, ADmmALTY LAW, 206:
"In case of accident the loss was divided between both parties in equal proportions."

"Lord Stowell (then Sir W. Scott), The Woodrop Sims, 2 Dodson, Adm. 83,
85 (1815). In The Lord Melville, 2 Shaw's App. Cas. 402 (1816), is a like dictum.
12MARSDEN, op. Cit. supra note 8, at 135.
3Hay v. Le Neve, 2 Shaw, 4o9 (Sc. A. C. 1824).
' 4The Chartered Mercantile Bank v. Netherlands India Co., io Q. B. D. 521
(1883). Etienne Cleirac, early French writer on marine insurance and sea laws.
He published several books and in 1671, Us ET COUTUMES DE LA MER.
153 KENT, CoMM. § 231.
'6 Devaux v. Salvador, 4 Ad. & El. 420, 5 L. 3. K. B. 134 (K. B. 1836).
17Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland v. P. & 0. Steam Navigation Co.,
7 App. Cas. 795, 799 (H. L. 1881). See especially at 819.
'8 See RoscoE, THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN MARITImE COLLISIONS, 20 et
seq.; MARSDEN, op. cit. supranote 8, at 137-138.
19See discussions of delegates in London in 1899, published as follows: International Maritime Committee, London Conference x899, on the Law of Collisions at
Sea and Shipowners Liability, published in Antwerp, by 3. E. Buschmann.
20The Milan, Lush. 388 (Adm. 1861).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the blame." The rule finally became statutory in England in 1873.21
In the Milan, the plaintiff, a cargo owner, had sued the non-carrying
ship. The cargo owner in a contract action, however, could recover
his whole damage from the carrying ship 2 unless limited by contract
or law.? The rule in England, and Canada, and all His Majesty's
Dominions, except South Africa now is the Proportional Liability
Rule as fixed in the Brussels Convention of 191.24
The Rule in the United States
The United States inherited its rule of equal division of damages, as
between vessels mutually at fault, from the English admiralty.
In some early cases damages were divided in cases of inscrutable
faultz as in cases of negligence, but this practice was abandoned
and fault had to be proved.2 6 Before 1854 the general practice in the
lower courts had been to divide the damages equally in cases where
both ships were in fault. In that year the case of the Schooner
Catherine reached the United States Supreme Court, and the rule
was finally settled and has since been adhered to.27 In personal
injury. cases, however, our courts have not felt bound by the rule.
2(18 7 3 ) 36 and 37 Vict. c 66, 525 (9). This rule absolutely confirmed in The
Chartered Mercantile Bank v. Netherlands India Co., io Q. B. D. 521 (1883),
and in The Drumlanrig, [1911] A. C. 16.
nThe Bushire, 5 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 416 (1886); The Chartered Mercantile
Bank v. Netherlands Co., supra note 21.
2
1Jenkins v. G. C. Ry., [1912] I K. B. I.
24
Maritimes Convention Act [(1911) I & 2 Geo. 5, c. 57]. This act incorporates the doctrine of the Milan, supra note 2o,and Drumlanrig, supra note 21.
See MARSDEN, op. cit supranote 8, at 145; The Umona, [1914] P. 141, 145 where
right of recovery against noncarrying vessel limited to proportion of that ship's
fault. See also MARSDEN, at 225.
25
The Sciota, 2 Ware, (Dar. 359) 360, Fed. Cas. No. 12, 508 (1847); The Fern
and The Swan, Newb. Adm. 158, Fed. Cas. No. 8,588 (1854); TheJohn Henry, 3
Ware, 264, Fed. Cas. No. 7,350 (186o)
26
The Jumna, 149 Fed. 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o6); The Sunnyside, 91 U. S. 2o8,
215-216 (1875); The Clara, 102 U. S. 200, (188o).
2
1The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, I7 How. 170, 177 (U. S. 1854); The
Maria Martin, 12 Wall. 31 (U. S. 1870); The North Star, io6 U. S. 17, I Sup.Ct. 41 (1882); 24 R. C. L. 1242. Some cases had apportioned damages in proportion to degree of fault. See e. g. The Mary Ida, 20 Fed. 741 (D. C. S. D. Ala.
1884). See a very interesting discussion by'the late Wilhelmus Mynderse of the
Victory-Plymothian collision in the report of the London, z899, Conf. of the Int.
Mar. Committee, supra,note ig, at 70. In that case, the Supreme Court gave
additional time for argument of the question on the foreign cases and reports
of conferences were submitted, but the court escaped the question by reversing
the lower court and holding only one ship to blame. 168 U. S. 410, 18 Sup. Ct.
149 (1897). Also MARSDEN, op. cit. supranote 8, at i5o n.
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But while our courts have followed the English admiralty rule in.
applying this equal division rule as between ships, they have departed sharply from the policy of the English courts in establishing
the rights of what they have termed "innocent" cargo. Like Dr.
Lushington in The Milan,28our courts have denied the validity of any
theory which would create such identity of ship and cargo as would
impute negligence of the ship to the cargo, 29 whereby cargo's right to
recover from the carrying ship would be defeated. But differing
from Dr. Lushington, our courts adopted the rule of common law, as
urged by Edward James, Q. C., plaintiff's counsel in The Milan,
that the offending ships are tortfeasors and "are jointly and severally
liable. The pldintiff may choose whom he will 6f his wrong-doers to
sue, and he generally chooses not him who did the most wrong, but
him who is most solvent." 30 The owner of cargo, therefore, under the
American admiralty law, may now (subject to statutory exemption)
recover his whole loss from any one ship singly or all jointly at fault
for a collision, and our courts have repeatedly declined to conform
to the English rule.3 The best expression of our courts' view of
28

Supra note 20.

29

This was the English common law position taken in Thorogood v. Bryan,
8 C. B. 115 (C. P. 1849), and Armstrong v. L. & Y. Ry., L. R. IoEx. 47 (Eng.
1875). See CARVER, CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA (7th ed.) 967. See the Bernina,
6 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 112 (1886).
30
The Milan, supra note 2o, at 394. Common law rule, see POLLOCic, THE
LAW OF TORTS (ixth ed.) 198-2oi; also HUGHES, ADmIRALTY (2d. ed. 1920)
282-283. See also Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co. 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231

(1928).
31

The Bristol,

29

Fed. 867 (S. D. N. Y. 1887); The Britannic, 39 Fed. 39.

(S. D. N. Y. 1889); The Steamer New Philadelphia, I Black 62, 76 (U. S.1861);
The Washington & Gregory, 76 U. S. 513 (1869); The Alabama and Gamecock,
92 U. S.695 (1875); The Atlas, 92 U. S. 302 (1876); The Sterling and Equator,
IO6 U. S. 647, I Sup. Ct. 89 (1882); The Virginia Ehrman add Agnese, 97 U. S.
3o9 (1877); The North Star, IO6 -T.S. 17, 1 Sup. Ct. 41 (1882); The City of
Hartford, 97 U. S. 323 (1877); The Manitoba, 122 U. S. 97, 7 Sup. Ct. 1158
(1887); The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540 19 Sup. Ct. 491 (1898); The City of
New York, 175 U. S. 187,20 Sup. Ct. 67 (1899); Erie R. R. Co. v. Erie & Western
Transp. Co., 204 U. S. 220, 27 Sup. Ct. 246 (1907); The Eugene F. Moran, 212
U. S.466, 29 Sup. Ct. 339 (19o9); The George W. Roby, ii1 Fed. 6oi (C. C. A.
6th, igoi); Great Lakes Towing Co. v. Massaba S. S. CO., 237 Fed. 577 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1916); The Sif, 266 Fed. 166 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); The John F. Wilson,
84 Fed. 204 (D. M. 1897).
But in the Eagle Point, 142 Fed. 453 (C. C. A. 3d 19o6), the British rule was
applied in the case of two British ships. In the Magmeric (Galef v. The United
States, not yet reported), argued last March (1928) by the writer, at Charleston,
S. C., before judge Hale of Maine sitting there, the court refused to apply the
German proportional rule in a case by an American citizen against an American
ship, one of two ships at fault in a collision happening in German waters. An
appeal is to be taken.
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the rights of an injured third party is found in the case of the Atlas,
where it was said in part:
"Nothing is more clear than the right of a plaintiff, having
suffered such a loss, to sue in a common-law action all the wrongdoers, or any one of them, at his election; and it is equally
clear, that, if he did not contribute to the disaster, he is entitled
to judgment in either case for the full amount of his loss. He
may proceed against all the wrong-doers jointly, or he may sue
them all or any one of them separately; but if he sues them all
jointly, and has judgment, he cannot afterwards sue them
separately, or if he sues one separately and has judgment, he
cannot afterwards sue them all in a joint action; because the
prior judgment against one is, in contemplation of law, an
election as to that one to pursue his several remedy, but it is
no bar to a suit for the same wrong against any one or more
of the other wrongdoers." Murray v. Lovejoy, 2 Cliff. x96; s. c.
3 Wall. ig; Smith v. Hines, 2 Sumn. 348; Webster v. Railroad,
38 N. Y. 261.
"Acts wrongfully done by the co-operation and joint agency
of several persons constitute all the parties wrongdoers, and
they may be sued jointly or severally; and any one of them,
said Spencer, C.. J., is liable for the injury done by all, if it appear
either that they acted in concert, or that the act of the individual sought to be charged ordinarily and naturally produced
the acts of the others. Guile v. Swen, 19 Johns. 382."
In the United States, when more than two ships are at fault, each
one is liable for an equal share of the damage, irrespective of their
ownership." But our admiralty courts, in an attempt to reach
more equitable results than the common law courts, depart from
the doctrine generally there applied33 and allow contributionbetween
the wrong-doers. u This right of contribution exists notwithstanding
the carrying ship is exonerated by the terms of the Harter Act, and
thus that Act is indirectly nullified through judicial legislation.3 5
32

The Eugene F. Moran, supra note 31; The Atlas, supra note 31; The Charles
See cases supra note 31.
33
For an excellent review of the right of contribution at common law as between joint tort feasors, see the very recent case of Goldman et al v. MitchellFletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, I4 Atl. 231 (1928) where His Honor Judge Edwin 0.
Lewis allowed contribution between wrongdoers, and his able opinion was unanimously affirmed on appeal.
34
The Chattahoochee and other cases cited supra note 31. In this case Chief
justice Fuller and Associate Justice Peckham dissented.
35
The Harter Act, Act of Feb. 13, x893, c. I05, 27 Stat. 445, U. S. Comp.
Stat. (Supp.,1923) §§ 8029-8035. See the Chattahooche, supra note 3I. The
late Wilhelmus Mynderse, of the New York Bar, a great admiralty lawyer, said
the doctrine of the Chattahoochee results unjustly; that the "honest and fair
rule" is the one which would put upon each vessel "primarily and finally a proportionate share of the resulting damage." London Conference Int. Mar. Com.,
supra note i9, at 81.
Allen, ii Fed. 317 (S. D. N. Y. 1882).
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The doctrine of contribution is firmly established, in our country,
and is believed by our judges to be eminently just,38 and underlies
the Admiralty Rules of the United States Supreme Court. 37
THE MARITIME CONVENTION RULE AND THE CHANGES ITS ADOPTION
WOULD EFFECT IN THE ADMIRALTY LAW AS Now ADMINISTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES
Having sketched briefly the origin and development of the admiralty equal division rule in collision cases, and having shown wherein that rule as applied in the United States differs from the English
rule, we may now consider the changes in our law which would be
brought about by the adoption of the Maritime Convention proportional rule.38 The following is from the convention, article 4.39
"If there is mutual fault, the liability of each vessel is in
proportion to the gravity of the faults respectively committed;
but, if, according to the circunstances, the proportion cannot
be established, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the
liability is apportioned equally.
The damages caused, either to the vessels or to their cargoes,
or to the effects or other property of the crews, passengers,
or other persons on board, are borne by the vessels in fault in
the above proportions, without joint liability toward third
parties."
"In respect of damage caused by death or personal injury,
the vessels in fault are jointly liable to third parties without
prejudice, however, to the right of contribution belonging to
the vessel which has paid a larger part than that which in accordance with the provisions of the first paragraph of this Article
she ought ultimately to bear."
"It is left to the law of each country to determine, as regards
such rights to obtain contribution, the meaning and effect of
any contract or provision of law which limits the
40 liability of
the owners of a vessel toward persons on board."
3
6The North Star; The Chattahoochee, both supra note 31; In re N. Y. &
Porto Rico S. S. Co., 155 U. S. 523 i Sup. Ct. 183 (1895); The Ira M. Hedges,

218 U. S. 264, 31 Sup. Ct. 17 (1910).
37
See
38

Admiralty Rule 56 (Old Rule 59), U. S. Comp. Stat. (g96) p. 2705.
See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911 at 20. Also same for igog,
at 66o, but phraseology here is somewhat different. It is to be noted that the
United States delegates reserved unimpaired the Harter Act of Feb. 13, 1893,
supra note 35. See For. Rel. U. S.19xi, at p. I8 for Reservations. Recommendation of the delegates is that the rule be made to apply only in litigations in
United States Courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Is this wise?
The writer cannot believe that it is for reasons which would appear obvious.
39It is not thought in England that the Convention rule changes the rule that
an innocent third vessel damaged in collision has a joint and several right to claim
against the other two which will still have contribution-see MARSDEN, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 197n.
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That the adoption of this rule would bring about radical changes
in the maritime collision laws of this country cannot for a moment be
doubted. The most important of these changes will now be -discussed: i. From the point of view of the shipowner, and 2. From
the point of view of the cargo-owner.
i.

From the point of view of the shipowner.

(a) There will be no change, except as to proportions, in calculating
ship damage. The damage sustained by each ship will be first ascertained. Recovery will then be allowed each ship from the other in
accordance with the proportional gravity of the fault of that other.
Recovery may be for one-half, as under our present rule; or, in
proportions of more than one-half, or less than one-half, depending
upon the gravity of fault. Thus, as shown in the illustration already given, recovery under the new rule would be:
Assumed facts:
Ship A held 314 to blame-damaged $oo,ooo.
Ship B held 4 to blame-damaged $ 50,000.
Ship A would recover from Ship B
34 of

$ 75,000.

$100,000

Ship A would have to pay ship B
I

of $50,000

12,500.

Difference

$62, 5 0.-A's net recovery.

Thus the change in rule will have caused ship A to gain in
recovery $37,500 more than she would have recovered under the
present rule; and, of course, the change will have caused ship B to
pay $37,500 more than under the present rule.
(b) In case, however, cargo aboard ship B should be damaged in
the collision, say to the extent of $5o,ooo, the situation would be
as follows:
Assumed facts:
Ship A 3/4 to blame--no cargo damage, but ship damaged
Ship B 34 to blame-ship
damaged
$50,000
her cargo damaged
50,000
Total B40

$100,000

$I00,000.

Total A-

$ioo,ooo

The writer will not discuss in this paper personal injury or death claims; nor
any provision affecting collisions other than the proportional rule of the Convention as to damiges as it affects ships and cargoes. There are otherprovisions
of the Convention affecting collisions.
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Settlement of DecreeA4
Ship A's account would stand:
Ship A recovers

Y4

of $ioo,ooo from

ship B for ship damage
Ship A pays to ship B
of $50,000
for ship damage
Ship A pays to cargo owner

Y4

$75,000.00
$12,500.00

of

$50,000

Total payments by ship A

12,500.00

$25,000.00

$25,000.00

Ship A's net recovery ....................... $50,000.00
So that ship A's loss will be ship
damage
Less net amount of recovery
Ship A's actual loss
Ship B's account would stand:
Ship B recovers 4 of $5o,ooo.oo
from ship A for ship damage
Ship B pays to ship A 3/4 of $ioo,ooo.oo for ship damage
Ship B pays nothing to cargo owner,
if we assume ship B to be protected against liability by virtue of
The Harter Act, for example.

$I00,000.00
50,000.00

$50,000.00

$12,500.00

$75,000.00

$62,500.00
So that ship B's total loss will be:
Loss by damage to herself
Payment to ship A for ship damage

Total
Ship damage recovered from ship A
Ship B's net loss

$50,000.00
75,000.00
$125,000.00
12,500.00
$112,500.00

"In all probability our courts will retain a discretionary power with respect to
costs which will have some restraining influence as regards the prosecution of
cases and appeals on speculative chances.
In the English courts the parties in these cases usually paid their own costs
until recently. A decision under the Convention rule has now held the court
had power to divide them. In the English courts litigation costs are very much
greater than in American courts; and some here think that the question of court
costs in the United States will not play much part in restraining litigation;
others have a contrary view.
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Cargo-ownersAccount:
Total loss in collision

5o,ooo.oo

Amount of recovery from ship A
(non-carrying ship) 314 of loss, being in proportion to the gravity

of fault adjudged against ship A

12,500.00

Actual loss to cargo-owner for which
he has no right of recovery against
either ship or their owners

$37,500.00

These results will, naturally, vary under the operation of the rule,
depending upon the assumed facts of each case. Always, however,
the carrying ship is likely to escape liability altogether for such part
of her cargo loss as the proportion of her fault for the collision bears
to the amount of that loss. In the case assumed, cargo would,
under the present rule, in the United States, recover the whole amount
of its loss from ship A and ship A would have contribution from ship
B for one-half the amount paid to the cargo owner. The account
would under that rule appear as follows:

Ship A damaged ..............

$0,ooo.oo

Ship B damaged ...............
Ship B's cargo damage..........

50,000.00

5o,ooo.oo

Ship A's Account:
Ship A recovers 3/ the difference between her own damage and that
of ship B, viz:

$25,000.00

Ship A, as the non-carrying ship, has
to pay the whole cargo damage

50,000.00

But is permitted by way of contribution to recover Y24 or $25,000
thereof from Ship B, making Ship
A's total recovery from Ship B

50,000.00

Ship A's actual loss is her own
damages
$100,000.00
plus the amount she paid B's cargo
50,000.00
Total
Less
The net loss of ship A therefore is

150,000.00

50,000.00
$ioo,ooo.oo
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Ship B's Account:
Ship B pays her own ship damage
Ship B pays j1 of balance of ship
damage which is in favor of ship
A, i. e. Y of $5o,ooo
Ship B makes good to ship A by
way of contribution Y2 of the
amount of cargo damage paid
by ship A to her cargo

Ship B's actual loss

$50,000.00
25,000.00

25,000.00

$ioo,ooo.oo

It appears, accordingly, that a change to the Convention rule will
be, as chance may have it, distinctly advantageous to ship-owners
whenever cargo is aboard either one or more of the colliding ships.
In short, the Convention rule permits, as between ships, an equitable
distribution of the collision loss upon the wrongdoing ships in proportion to the degrees of fault for which they are respectively held
guilty and does not arbitrarily say: you must find each ship one-half
to blame. The rule will also prevent a cargo owner recovering from a
ship by indirection what could not be recovered directly on account
of the Harter Act's exemptions, which, of course, is an advantage
to the ship-owner, and would at least seem to be in accord with our
national policy as expressed in the Harter Act.4
2. From the point of view of the cargo-owner.
The admiralty law of the United States has always, as shown,
given the cargo-owner full protection against his losses in collisions.
The cargo owner has been regarded as "innocent." The liability of
the colliding ships has been held to be joint and several. The "general
ship" was a common carrier with the usual liability of such 43 and,
prior to the Harter Act, responsible for all losses, however occasioned,
unless by the act of God, public enemy or by some other cause or
accident, without any negligence of the ship, expressly excepted
in the bill of lading.4 Stipulations exonerating a ship from losses due
42

Notwithstanding the Chattahoochee, supra note 31. See the discussions in
the Report of the London Conference of the International Maritime Committee,
1899, supra note i9. There both sides of the question were presented and had as
advocates some of the most eminent judges, lawyers, text-book writers, and
practical steamship men.
43
Law prior to Harter Act. The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 7 (U. S.
i858).
44
Liverpool & Great Western S. S. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 9
Sup. Ct. 469 (1889); The Guildhall, 58 Fed. 796 (S. D. N.Y. 1893), aft 'd 64 Fed.
867 (C. C. A. 2d, 1894); The Glennavis, 69 Fed. 472 (E. D. Pa. 1895); and this
was so notwithstanding stipulation may have been valid where contract of
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to negligence were, and still are, always held void in the United
States courts as contrary to public policy. The Harter Act, passed
in 1893, prohibited the insertion of negligence clauses, but prescribed
the conditions under which, if complied with, a shipowner might
escape liability for negligence. 5 This act does not protect a ship
against loss due to negligent loading,' stowage, custody, care or
proper delivery of cargo, so that the carrying vessel is liable for
losses due to such negligence, and the Convention Rule is not likely
46
to affect recovery for such losses.
The Maritime Convention rule will result in giving full and no
doubt intended effect to the Harter Act by doing away with the
doctrine announced in the Chatahoochee, whereby indirect recovery is
allowed through the theory of contribution against the carrying ship.
It may be safely asserted, therefore, that the Maritime Convention
rule will result disadvantageously to cargo interests and their underwriters in any view which may be taken of the application of that rule.
The foregoing discussion and what will now follow, taken together
with the above consideration of the subject from the point of view
of the shipowner, sufficiently suggests how the Convention rule will
affect cargo interests.
SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR AND AGAINST ADOPTING THE
PROPORTIONAL DIVISION RULE

The equal division rule, as it finally emerged in the admiralty
practice and was inherited by us from England, represents, in its
carriage was made. See Liverpool & Great Western S. S. Co. and cases in which
that case had been followed. Otherwise, if ship is private carrier or voyage is
between foreign ports and stipulation valid where made. The Fri, 154 Fed. 333
(C. C. A. 2d 1907), certiorari denied, 210 U. S. 431, 28 Sup. Ct. 761 (x9O8);
Golcar S. S. Co. v. Tweedie Trading Co., 146 Fed. 563 (S. D. N. Y. 19o6); The
Royal Scepter, 187 Fed. 224, (S. D. N. Y. 1911); The Miguel di Larrinaga,
217 Fed. 678 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
"Some of leading cases on carriage of goods under the Harter Act are: The
Delaware, x61 U. S. 459, x6 Sup. Ct. 516 (1896); The Carib Prince, 170 U. S.
655, 18 Sup.'Ct. 753 (1898); Knott, Pelihoner v. Botany Worsted Mills, I79
U. S. 69, 2i Sup. Ct. 30 (1898); Gvt. Nay. Co. v. Farr & B. M. Co., x8i U. S.
218, 21 Sup. Ct. 591 (19o); The Wildcraft, 201 U. S. 378, 26 Sup. Ct. 467 (19o6);
The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 22 Sup. Ct. 102 (19o2); The Folnina, 212 U. S.
354, 29 Sup. Ct. 363 (19o9); The Aprillao, 27o Fed. 426, (C. C. A. 2d, 1920);
Herman v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 242 Fed. 859, (C. C. A. 2d,
1917). These cases are taken from LORD & SPRAGUE'S admirable'little book
CASES ON ADMIRALTY, and are very good selections. Reference is made to the
excellent foot-notes therein to be found.
"1See § i of the Harter Act and the cases supra note 44. For the modem English
view see COLE, op. cit. supra note 5.

PROPORTIONAL DAMAGE RULE AT SEA
departure from the common law rule, simply an attempt to make a
more equitable distribution of the losses among the wrongdoing
ships. The Maritime Convention rule is likewise nothing more than
a further attempt to attain that ideal-exact justice. Accordingly,
there is no need to fear that a change will violate any "principle,"
certainly in so far as the relation between ships is concerned. It has
long been recognized that in application the equal division rule
frequently brings about grossly inequitable results. In 1873 the Supreme Court of the United States 7 laid down the rule that when a
ship in collision is at the time violating a statutory rule intended to
prevent collisions, it is a reasonable presumption that the fault was at
least a contributory cause of the disaster, and, therefore, that the ship
must show not merely that her fault might not have been one of the
causes or that it probably was not, but that "it could not have been."
A similar rule was by statute adopted in England. 48 Therefore,
even though one ship may have been guilty of very slight fault and
the other of very gross fault, they pay the same. This happened in
the S. S. Selja and S. S. Beaver collision49 and in the S, S. Pomaron
and S. S. Alleghany collision."
In this last case proctors for the
S. S. Pomaron urged in their brief application of a proportional
division, but, of course, the plea was disregarded. In that case
the S. S. Alleghany's liability was limited, which resulted in considerable hardship for the other vessel. In commenting upon the
case the district court for the Southern District of New York said
that the case is one "which shows the necessityfor the proposednew rule
which will not hold each ship in solido, but will apportion liability
according to fault." The operation of the present rule may often
make it to the advantage of the carrying ship to admit entire fault
for a collision-she may then get off from all cargo payment. England has, by adopting the Convention proportional division rule
abolished, says Mr. Marsden,5 an arbitrary rule and leaves the
47The
48

Pennsylvania, 19 Wall. 125 (U. S. 1873).
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, § 419 (4), (1894) 57 & 58 Vict. c 71, § 419 (4).
49
Lie, Master of S. S. Seija, etc., v. San Francisco & Portland S. S. Co., 243
U. S. 291, 37 Sup. Ct. 270 (1917).
5
OYang-Tze Ins. Ass'n. v. Furness Withy & Co., 215 Fed. 859 (C. C. A. 2d,
1914), certiorari discussed and dismissed, 242 U. S. 430, 37 Sup. Ct. 141 (1917).

See also Richelieu Nay. Co. v. Boston Marine Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 674, 1o Sup.
Ct. 934 (189o); and Belden v. Chase, 15o U. S. 674, 14 Sup. Ct. 264 (1893);
and the English rule was (prior to x91i) the same, The Agra, L. R. I P. C. 5oi,
504, 5o5 (Eng. 1867).
51

MARSDEN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 66. But Mr. Marsden thought the cargo
should always have right to recover. See his statement London Conf. z899,
I.W. Mar. Com., supra note I9, at 84, 85.
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court to follow "what is a reasoning judgment and to say: 'Did this
want of obeying the regulations in any way contribute to the collision?' not 'Might it possibly have done so.' "
Some years ago it is known that a communication was addressed
to a number of United States judges in different parts of the United
States asking their views upon the proposed convention rule as it
would affect ships. Of the answers received, 26 favored, and two
opposed, the change. Many of those favoring change were eminent
judges of very considerable admiralty experience, especially in
collision cases. Shipowners contend that the change will correct an
unjust application of the Hatter Act, namely, the indirect recovery
by cargo through the doctrine of contribution already referred to as
established by the Chattahoochee; also that the change will prevent
shipowners having to pay a part of the loss largely in excess of their
ship's proportionate degree of fault, and also the highly inequitable
results in cases where the grossly negligent vessel cannot or does not
respond for her share of the loss. This change, it is said, will affect
only underwriters, and that they are in no way interested in legal
principles which form the basis of liability. 52
In application, the proportional rule is working satisfactorily in
the countries which have adopted it, and no difficulties are being
experienced. 3 The writer has seen letters to this effect written by
eminent foreign admiralty lawyers, insurance officers and shipping
men. The American delegates signing the Convention: reported
that judges were having no difficulty in applying the rule and that it
was a rule which in practice is often followed in reaching compromise
settlements. Our judges are frequently doing just as difficult things
in making apportionments in salvage and personal injury- awards as
they will be called upon to do in fixing the degrees of fault of colliding
vessels.55
In the event, however, that it is not possible to determine the
degree of fault the rule itself makes provision that the equal division
rule shall apply. In the English cases reported in Lloyd's List Law
52

ROSCOE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 22.
"..
In our courts (U. S.) 99/tooths of the maritime litigation is promoted by
underwriters and 99/Iooths is defended by underwriters." London Conference,
1899. Int. Mar. Com., supra note ig, at 137.
OForeign Relations of United States (I9o9) 657.
54
Merchant Marine Act 1920, § 33, 41 S. L. 988. Also personal injury cases in
admiralty; also salvage cases.
5See London Conf. z8pp, Im. Mar. Com., supra note ig, at 7In.
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Reports for the years 1922 to 1927 inclusive, there appear 316 collision cases, divided as follows:
247 cases one ship is held solely to blame;
40 cases the damages are equally divided;
13 cases the damages are divided 1 /3and

2

/3;

13 cases the damages are divided 3/5 and 2 /5
i case the damages are divided 1/5 and 4 5.
In at least one very important manner, however, the change might
affect the relations between shipowners and their underwriters.
The decisions now hold that a collision, both vessels at fault, gives
rise to a single liability and not to cross liabilities. It is not clear
what effect the Convention rule will have upon these decisions,
bearing in mind that ships are often insured in different insurance
companies in various parts of the world. There is here involved the
construction and practical operation of what is known as the "collision" or "running down clause." The question arises upon the
construction to be placed upon the expression which requires the
underwriters to pay "the sum which the insured becomes liable to
pay, and shall pay." It would require too much space to discuss
this problem here, but those who wish to consider the matter in its
legal aspects are referred to the authorities. 8 The change of rule in
England has not, so far as known, brought about any change in the
"collision" clauses in that country and London is the marine insurance center of the world. But whatever effect the change might
have would probably soon be adjusted by underwriters through
appropriate contract provisions and agreements, as they have heretofore met changes in the law.57
Some opponents of the change say that there will be uncertainty on
appeals and weakness in judgments, because judges are not likely to
be in accord in their estimates upon the degrees of fault of the respective ships. The response made to this is that there is not likely
1See 38 C. J. 1102-1103; I ARNOULD, LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE AND
AVERAGE (ioth ed.) §§ 791-796; Gow, MARINE INSURANCE (3d ed. 19o3)
c. XV, especially pp. 248 and 251 et seq.; MARSDEN, op. Cit. supra note 8, at 14515o inclusive; MCARTHUR, LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE (2d ed. 189o) 358, and
Appendix II and Appendix III, pp. 370-378, inclusive, and the cases cited by the
authors named; ELDRIDGE, MARINE POLICIES (2d ed.) 153.
See the following cases: Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., 14 Pet. 99 (U. S. 184o);
General Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. 351 (U. S. 1852); Western Transit
Co. v. Brown, 161 Fed. 869 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o8). See note 2 ARNOULD, MARINE
INSURANCE (llth ed.) ioi8, comparing English and American cases.
57
It is thought by Mr. Marsden that the Convention rule will affect the decisions and that the liabilities may under it be held to be cross instead of, as now,
single. See MARDSDEN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 147-148.
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to be more diVrgenc& of view than now exists when appeals are
prosecuted in mutual fault cases. The English courts have held, in
cases since adoption of the Convention i-le, that the decision of
the judge of first instance should not lightly be interfered with, 58
but in the case cited the court did interfere. And see the Clara
Cadmus,5" where there is a criticism of the rule and a warning against
too great refinement in determining degrees of fault.
In England in the trial of actiols for collisions and salvage the
judges of the Admiralty Division (Probate Divorce and Admiralty
Division) of the High Court of Justice are usually assisted by two
Elder Brethren of the Trinity House, which was incorporated in 1516
by a charter from Henry VIII. In 1673 nautical experts were for the
first time called in to advise. Nautical assessors now assist the Court
of Appeal anid the House of Lords in admiralty cases. The assessors
who advise are two of the Elder Brethren of the Trinity House. The
courts may call for advice and assistance. The judges are not bound
by the advice, for decisions rest entirely with the judges. There are
often disagreements. Where these advisers are sitting upon a trial,
expert evidence is inadmissible. 0 In the United States there are no
similar officials whose function it is to aid our courts in nautical
matters, and it is asserted that out Judges are not prepared for determining niceties of fault on the part of several vessels in collision.
This objection was considered at the 1899 London Coivrention of the
International Maritime Committee. The late Wilhelmus Mynderse,
a distinguished admiralty lawyer of New York, who represented
58
The Peter Benoit, 84 L. J. R. 87 (1914), Court of Appeals (with nautical
assessors). This was an appeal in which the lower court was reversed. The
House of Lords, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals which
had changed a 1/ sand 4/5 decision to equal division. The House of Lords also
held that the fault to degree of which liability is to be apportioned means a fault
causing or contributing to the collision.
59
The Clara Cadmus, 26 Lloyd's List L. R. 39.
6
OSome cases are given for those interested in the subject. The Hankow,
4 P. D. 197 (Eng. 1879); The Hannibal, L. R. 2 Ad. & El. 53, 56 (1867); The
Assyrian, 6 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 521 (Eng. 1889); The Banshee, 6 Asp. Mar. L.
Cas. 13o (Eng. 1889); The Hounthandel, i Spinks, Eccl. & Adm. 25 (Eng. 1833);
The Princess Alice, 3 W. Rob. 138 (Eng. 1848); The Christiania, 7 Notes of Cases,
2, at 7 (Eng. 1847); The Gannet,[igool A. C. 235; The Beryl, 9 P. D. 137 (Eng.
1884); The City of Berlin, (19o8) P. iio; The Philotaxe, 3 Asp. Mar. L. Cas.
512 (Eng. 1877); The Magna Charter x, Asp. Mar. L. Cas. (1871); The Bella
Donna, No. 6072 (1869) (case reheard with three Trinity Masters); The Ann
& Mary, 2. W. Rob. 189 (Eng. 1843); The Sir Robert Peel, 4 Asp. Mar. L.
Cas. 321 (Eng. x88o);The Marathon, 4 Asp. Mar. L. Cas. 75 (Eng. 1879);
In the Olaf Nickelsen, Fo. 50 (1894), the Trinity Masters went to inspect the
place of a grounding. See also the Victor Govacevich, io P. D. 4o (Eng. 1885).
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with Ambassador Choate, the Maritime Law Association of the
United States at that meeting, said:
"This does not appear to me as an individual nor does it
appear to our Admiralty Judge in New York nor to many others
that there would be any practical difficulty in applying the rule.
It seems to me that you leave to the discretion of the Judge a
good many things, and if you included this there would not be
wider questions involved than he has to pass upon in Salvage
actions and in cases of personal injury. So that if it comes to a
vote, I am entirely free to cast my personal vote in favor of the
proportional rule. I should like it to be understood that my
association has adopted the rules as to its justice, but it is divided in opinion
as to the practicability of the application of
61
the rule."
In practice in the United States litigants introduce expert testimony
upon matters involving seamanship to aid our courts which consider
but may disregard such expert opinions. 2
But it is not likely that objections to a change to the proportional
rule will come from shipowners and their insurers, for such a change
would be really in the nature of an aid to the shipowning interests.
It is really, as stated, largely a matter for underwriters, although it is
believed there are some interests which carry their own insurance on
their ships and the cargoes which they transport as incident to their
business. Still, they really become in this way insurers and stand
like them. Objection will unquestionably come, however, from shippers of cargo and their underwriters, for as shown cargo will lose
some of the protection which it enjoys under the present rules.
About 1911, after the Convention was signed and submitted to our
state department, it was rumored that certain milling interests made
concerted protests against ratification of the Convention. It did not
appear what influences were at work to bring these protests about.
But since 191o, the United States has become, as later shown, the
second largest owner of the world's sea tonnage and great efforts are
now under way to maintain our merchant flag on the seas. Congress has passed the so-called Jones-White Bill, which has been
signed by the President, and is now the law. This bill and the
large appropriations contemplated in aid of our Merchant Marine
seem to assure a determination on the part of the American
people to maintain our merchant fleet. So it may be that our
national policy is now to be one which will give far more consideration than heretofore to the position of the ship under our maritime
6
'Report
6

of London Conference, supra note I9,at 71.
2See generally The Conqueror, 166 U. S. iO, r33, 17 Sup. Ct. 510 (1896).
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laws, in order to encourage shipowning and operation. But it will be
urged that thus far our national policy has certainly been directed
to cargo protection as against ship protection for the reason that the
United States is largely a cargo-shipping nation; that the reason for
that policy still exists since we are still essentially shippers of cargo
and not carriers of cargo. That we are great shippers of cargo cannot be gainsaid. Let us examine for a moment our cargo tonnage, its
value and the tonnage of our ships and what they carry. From these
it will appear how largely we still remain shippers as against carriers of
cargo. These figures are as follows: The water borne foreign commerce of the United States increased 18.7% from 1921 to 1926, excluding coal shipped on account of the British strike,-or, from
81,824,834 cargo tons in 1921 to 97,125,756 tons in 1926. In value
this trade was 86,888,o8o,ooo in 1921, whereas in 1926 (excluding
coal) it was $9,045,869,ooo. This represents an increase over 1921 of
31.3%. Including the United States, thirty-three countries participated in the carriage of our foreign trade of 1926. This resulted
in almost. 58,5oo entrances and clearances involving 5,761 vessels
(ioo gross tons or over) of over 112,8oo,ooo cargo tons (including
coal). Of this number of vessels the United States has 1676 vessels
(oo gross tons or over) carrying 38,200,000 cargo tons, representing
about 34% of our total foreign trade. In the foreign trade of the
United States, trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific and east and west coast
of South America (overseas foreign trade) there were engaged 3,830
vessels (ioo gross tons or over) carrying 69,821,000 cargo tons. Of
these vessels the United States had 596 which carried only about
22% of this total tonnage transported. The water borne foreign
import and export cargoes carried in foreign vessels increased 87.4%
from 1921 to 1926. While American vessels carried 51% of our total
foreign import and export cargo tonnage in 1921, in 1926 they transported only 25%. On the other hand, and considering our ship
owning interests4 the merchant seagoing tonnage of the United
"These and the following figures are obtained from Part2, Merchant Marine
Hearings before the House Committee, Washington, March 2-14, 1928. The
cargo figures are from Report Economist, Bureau of Operations, U. S. Shipping
Board. See Part-2, Merchant Marine Hearings, 766.
6These figures have been taken from schedules filed by Homer L. Ferguson,
President New Port News Shipbuilding Dry Dock Company, and President
of the National Council of Shipbuilders, who is highly regarded in shipping circles.
These schedules, as well as many other interesting statistics, from various sources,
are in Part 2, at 294. Hearingsbefore Merchant Marine & Fisheries Committee of
House of Rep. March 2-14, 1928, which may be obtained from Government
Printing Office at Washington.
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States (i,ooo and above gross tons) July i, 1927 was 2,226 ships
(excluding Great Lakes) of a total of 10,872,539 gross tons against
British Empire 4,319 ships totalling 19,924,953 (excluding Canadian
Lake shipping) gross tons. But of that tonnage the average tonnage
laid up, as of July 1, 1927, was for the United States, including ships
privately owned and those owned by the United States Shipping
Board, 694 ships of 3,183,318 tons, while for the British Empire
the number of laid up ships was iii with a tonnage of only 387,256.
These figures for the United States exclude shipping on the Great
Lakes.
Since the problem involved in this change of rules largely concerns
insurance, "e may very well consider the two interests from the point
of view of insurance premiums. It is estimated that there is available
in the United States from Si5,ooo,ooo to $17,500,000 of insurance
premiums for ship, and about $40,000,000 of premiums for cargo
insurance; that of the former only about $io,ooo,ooo represent
premiums from ocean going tonnage, of which two-thirds at present
go abroad, while of the latter (cargo) about 90 to 95 per cent. is retained in the United States." The premiunms represent, of course,
many millions property value. In ship insurance the premiums are
usually yearly, while in cargo insurance the turnover is rapid.
When it is stated that objections to the change are likely to come
from cargo .shipping interests, it is highly important to understand
that this does not mean the American individual or corporate shipper
of cargo. On the contrary, it may be safely asserted that
the American owner and shipper of cargo, i. e., our merchant, is
not in general interested at all. Practically all cargoes are insured.
In this day of keen competition by insurance companies for cargo insurance in this country, as well as elsewhere, such insurance may be
obtained, and usually is obtained, covering every conceivable risk
to which cargo is likely to be subjected in course of its transportation.
In fact, insurance documents form in most cases part of our banking
scheme whereby merchants are enabled to secure at once payment for
their goods. So that the merchant who does not insure his goods
for the voyage is speculating for small gain contrary to sound business
practice. There are many forms of cargo marine insurance, but this
is no place to discuss these various forms. It is sufficient to say
6Charles R. Page, President Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Home Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., Chairman American Marine Insurance Syndicate and President Board
of Marine Underwriters of New York, testifying before Merchant Marine Committee on Friday, March 9, 1928.
See Part 2, Hearings supra note 64,
at 509-510.
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that practically all shipments are insured to full value against all
sorts of causes of loss. The insertion in marine cargo policies of-what
are known as "institute causes" and the like, which admit the seaworthiness of the ship as between the cargo owner and his insurer,
has taken from the shipper the burden imposed upon him by the
So that now when a loss occurs
implied warranty of seaworthiness.
due to the happening of a marine peril the merchant turns at once to
his insurer who pays him, in the absence of fraud, promptly. The
insurer then fights out the legal questions with the shipowner who is
nearly always represented in like manner by his insurer or the mutual
protection company or club in which his ship is entered. The legal
contests are, ttherefore, contests between insurance companies on the
one hand and ship protection clubs and ship insurers on the other.
The actions are prosecuted under rights of subrogation either in the
name of the insurance company or the insttred, as convenience or
policy might dictate-the expenses of the litigation being born by
the insurers or the club. Insurance companies usually do both a cargo
and a ship insurance business, so that at onemoment a company will be
for the ship and the next for cargo,-or, one company may be on both
sides of the fence as the result ofasingledisaster. Anericanmarine insurance companies, and foreign marine insurance companies accredited for doing business in the United States, are naturally more interested in cargo insurance because in that there is a far greater
volume of business offered to them in this country and the cargo
business is said to be more profitable to the companies than is ship
insurance.
The insurance companies, it is urged, will increase the premiums
which merchants have to pay, if the Convention rule is adopted, since
those premiums are based upon recoveries in litigation, and such
recoveries will be greatly reduced where there is only a several liability imposed. The writer has failed in an effort to secure any information in regard to the proportion of marine losses attributable to
mutual fault collisions; and careful inquiries at well informed sources
do not confirm the apprehension that a change of rule will increase
cargo premiums. All the authorities conferred with seem to agree
that the spread in cargo insurance is so great, owing to the large
volume of such business, that even if any increase of premium should
OSee the Clinchfield Fuel Co. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 121 S. C. 305, 114 S. E.
543 (1922), argued by the writer. This case shows one construction of the Institute clause. See also WINTER, MARINE INSURANCE (1919) 177; also 12 Asp.
Mar. L. C s. 246 (Eng. 1912). I ARNOLD, op. cit. supra note 56, at I9. The
Institute clauses do not affect the relations between the insured and the ship.
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come it would be entirely too small to become a factor in business
transactions. They seem also to be agreed that, while recoveries in
this litigation may theoretically play a part in premium fixing, in
practice they really do not. In this connection it should be recalled
that it usually takes years to adjust annual accounts in these particular matters, so that it would seem difficult to believe that recoveries in litigations have any real influence in determining the
amount of the premiutm charge. This change in the rule of damages
will surely not increase losses, and if cargo insurance takes thereby
a greater load then, theoretically at least, there should be a corresponding release of that load from hull insurance--and the insurance companies are generally engaged in both linds of insurance.
It has likewise been urged that a change to the proposed rule will
not be in the interest of public policy since shipowners will not use
the same degree of care exercised tinder the old rule. The operation
of the Convention rule in other countries applying it does not seem to
justify any such fear. It is submitted that there are too many
impelling reasons of both business and policy which require a shipowner to use care for the safety of his ship for him to be affected in
this respect by a change to the new rule.
Whether the proportional damage rule in collisions should be
adopted in the United States is after all a question of expediency--a
matter of policy. Are the objections offset by the advantages to be
gained from unification of the laws of sea trade? That is the real
question. The writer does not share the feeling that a change will
violate some great "principle" of law. It is urged that it does especially because cargo has always been allowed to make its loss good
as against any or all joint tort feasors; and that in Admiralty the
principle of contribution between wrongdoing ships is firmly established. But old principles as regards negligence are being constantly
modified whenever expediency seems to demand a modification.
Where, for example, are now our principles of the law of tort in respect
to contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule, etc.? We departed from principlewhen we passed the Harter Act. That operates
very much like the negligence clause and yet our principle had always been against permitting a shipowner to exempt himself from
liability for the negligence of his servants. Do we not also depart
from principle (notwithstanding its history) when we say a steamship owner shall not be liable when his ship has sunk through the
negligence of her master and crew, his agents? The English require
their shipowners to pay a certain amount per ton. If we now say
cargo cannot recover from the noncarryig ship, the amount which
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by law it cannot recover from the carrying ship, is not that really
putting into effect a principle already adopted in well considered
legislation which itself is already a departure from principle? It
may not be expedient as a matter of national business policy to adopt
the new rule and apply it to cargo. The predominant insurance
business interests of our country may insist upon retaining the
present rule, but we should not confuse our reasoning in the matter by
declining to make the change under a claim that some great principle
is involved. It is a duty of the legal profession to discard mere
principle when the demands of a new age require change. Legal
tradition may retard but it cannot, in the long run, prevent changes
7
in fixed rules of law when demand for a change is apparent.
If it should be found desirable to change our law to the Convention
rule as regards ships, but not as regards cargo, cargo could be excepted
from the operation of the rule in the same manner that claims due
to death and personal injury have been excepted in the 3 d para8
graph of Article 4 of the Convention.
Since a change from our present rule to the Convention rule is a
matter of policy or business expediency, the general public will, of
course, be afforded in due time an opportunity to express its views
for and against ratification of the Convention. This opportunity
will come when the State Department transmits the proposed Convention to the Senate and the usual proceedings get under way for
consideration of the matter. Then shipowners, underwriters of both
hull and cargo, protection and indemnity companies and clubs,
interests which are uninsured (if any), partly insured or which carry
their own insurance, small craft interests, and persons generally
concerned with maritime affairs will have a chance to point out
what the real interest of our commerce demands. There has already
been some consideration given the subject in the United States.
For example, the Maritime Law Association of the United States, a
body of admiralty lawyers, underwriters, etc., has at various times
for some years considered this proposed rule. In 1899 that Association sent Wilhelmus Mynderse, Esq.69 to the London Conference
of the International Maritime Committee which discussed the proposed rule. He presented the Association's action which had been
taken on June 28, 1899 upon a circular of the Executive Council of
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See the 3d paragraph of Article 4 of the Convention quoted above.
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See above reference to Mr. Mynderse, supra note 35. He had had a great
deal of experience in collision trials in different parts of the country.
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the Cbrnitd Maritime International which had propounded the questions. This action reported was to the effect that as to vessels the
Maritime Law Association of the United States recognized the more
exact theoretical justice of degrees of apportionment, but "are so
nearly divided in opinion as to the difficulties of such a rule in practice
that they are not prepared to make any positive recommendation in
regard to it." As to cargo, the reported action was that the innocent
third party injured by the joint fault of two vessels should have the
right to hold them and their owners responsible jointly and severally,
with the right of contribution as between the vessels. Mr. Mynderse
presented this report, but stated his personal views which he said
were contrary to the action of the Association and so he refrained from
voting in London.70 In 1922, this Association again considered the
subject. This time the special committee appointed to study and
report upon the matter reported favorably upon the adoption of the
Convention rule. The report was received and ordered filed, printed
and distributed and the committee continued. In 1927, a new special
committee having been appointed, another report was presented in
which the majority was against adopting the Convention. The considerations actuating the majority in this report were: (a) that the
rule imposed too great a burden on our judges; (b) that The City of
New York rule7' that Courts should not look for minor faults, is
sufficient for practical purposes; (c) that the in extremis rule would be
emasculated: (d) that collision litigation would be carried to common
law courts; (e) that appeals would be increased and compromise
settlements made more difficult. The report also cites an English
court criticism of the working of the rule. 72 Upon this report of the
special committee the Association by majority vote passed a resolution against adoption by this country of the Convention rule.
The American Bar Association has had the matter under consideration for several years and a bill was drafted, but the association has
not yet finally acted.73 The report of the executive committee of that
association, dated July 14, 1926, states that because of many apparently well considered protests against the bill "Relating to the Maintenance of Suits for Damages by Collision on the High Seas and
other Navigable Waters," recommended for approval by report
70
See Report of London Conference 1899 Int. Mar. Com., supra note 19, at 21,
and the debates presented in the volume.
71147 U. S. 72, 13 Sup. Ct. 211 (1892).
72 The Clara Cadmus, supra note 59.
73See Amx. B. A. REP. for past several years, especially reports of Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law and of the Committee on Admiralty and
Maritime Law.
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of the committee on admiralty and maritime law, that the bill be not
approved and the subject matter be referred to the committee on
admiralty and maritime law. In 1927 this committee did not report
upon the subject and it is still before that committee for report to
the association.
Very considerable public discussi9n of the subject of this Convention is certain to come in due course. In the meantime there may
be some advantage in considering part of the debate in the House of
Lords in England before Great Britain changed its rule and adopted
the rule of the Convention.7 4
In the House of Lords on October 3 1, 1911, Lord Herschell, former
L. C. said:
"The first criticism was that this proportional rule was not
founded on principle. I think that to a certain extent this'is
true, but one might suppose that those who advanced this argument in order to retain the present rule the Adrpralty rulewere urnde-r the impression that the Admiralty rule was founded
on principle. This I do not think anybody could maintain,
for it has been known for many years as rusticum judicium,
a rough-and-ready form of justice. On the other hand, there
does seem to be in the proportional rule, a cert ai amount of
what one might, perhaps, call principle, in the fact that the
proportional rnoe endeavors to make the greater sinner pay
the penalty."
In the course of the same debate Lord Goell criticized the proposed rule. The Lord Chancellor (Earl Loreburn) st4ted that Lord
Gorell (fornerly Sir J(hn Gorell Barnes) was the first authority in
England and probably one of the first anywhere upon the matter.
Lord Gorell said the rule endeavors to establish a form of liability
practically impossible to apply with any degree of accurapy, and that
in this:
"I have the authority of Judges of the Admiralty Court in former days . . . and the older Judges in the Admiralty Division,
or the Admiralty Court as it then was, got rid of all that difficulty by declaring that no human being could say how much
blame was to be attached to each of the vessels. They, therefore, adopted the rule that if both contributed to the collision
each should bear one-half the loss, and that has been the English
rule."
Then Lord Gorell said it had been reported that ninety per cent of
the "both to blame" cases on the continent had been divided by
74
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the judges equally. In other words, that meant simply that the
judges could not determine the degree of fault of each vessel and
"consequently they have jumped it, as our old Admiralty judges did,
by saying each pays half." He felt, he said, that a judge should not
be placed in an arbitrator's position to make a "rough-and-ready
shot as to blame" for that would tend to wealmess of decision. And,
moreover, that on appeals great difficulty would be encountered
because he could not see how two men will necessarily come to the
same conclusion "on the question of proportion of fault, or how there
is to be any definite certainty of decision." Criticisms were also
directed at the rule by the Lord Chancellor and Earl Halsbury.
Lord Herschell, in answer, said that the bill had a distinct provision
which allowed the court to give a half-and-half decision where it
cannot arrive at a conclusion as to what is the proportion of fault;
that the foreign cases having been decided ninety per cent half-andhalf division there was only a small minority where presumably the
judge had no difficulty.
"It is, of course," said he, "impossible to expect Courts to
work out the proportion of blame with mathemetical accuracy,
but at any rate the provisions of this clause do admit of some
differentiation being made where the greater culpability of
one vessel is flagrant and proved beyond all doubt."
Lord Gorell, however, in his concluding remarks made this notable
statement:
"There has also been a feeling amongst a large section in
England that it is an advantageous rule to have, and I do not
think I can say that in the objections I have stated that I have
had that support which resists a general agreement all over the
ocean; you have, on the one hand, the great desire for uniformity
of the law all over the ocean; you have an agreement by the
nations which will produce that uniformity; and you have, as
against that, the objections which I have stated. While probably your Lordships will think that the advantages of uniformity
outweigh the objections I have suggested, I have felt it a duty
that one who has a great deal to do with these cases should state
the objections so that the House should be in full possession of
the general considerations applicable to this question before
coming to a definite conclusion upon it."
In answer to the charge that litigation would be increased, Lord
Herschell said:
"This is, of course, a matter which can only really be decided by, experience. But it is contended that there may be
some inducement under this rule to contest a case in the hope
of only having to pay a minority of the damages. On the other
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hand, by adopting this rule there will be no longer the incentive
which there is under the existing law to proceed with an action
in the hope of getting off with half of the damages instead of
the whole amount because the other vessel concerned was in
fault in a small or technical degree."
The subject of this article is complex, with many difficult legal and
business problems which cannot be treated adequately in limited
space. It is the hope of the writer, however, that what has been set
down here shall prove of aid (by way of suggestion) to those concerned or interested in maritime affairs.

